Echenique (2004) concludes that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games. In the context of two stage, 2 × 2 games, we find that the restrictiveness imposed by quasisupermodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, in the sense that the set of games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has measure zero. In contrast, the set of such games that exhibit strategic complements (in the sense of increasing best responses) has infinite measure. Our characterization allows one to write uncountably many examples of two stage, 2 × 2 games with strategic complements. The results show a need to go beyond a direct application of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property to define strategic complements in extensive form games.
identifies a potential concern about the possibility of strategic complements in extensive form games. Using a natural definition of strategic complements for such games (each player's payoff function satisfies standard notions of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property in every subgame), he gives several examples showing that games that should intuitively exhibit strategic complementarities do not satisfy this definition. He also gives examples of simple extensive form games that cannot be made into extensive form games with strategic complements. He concludes that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games.
We explore the extent of this restrictiveness in the context of two stage, 2 × 2 games.
In particular, we inquire if this restrictiveness is due to the assumption of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property (which are typical sufficient conditions for strategic complements in games)? Or, is it related to the more fundamental notion of strategic complements (in terms of increasing best responses)?
We find that the restrictiveness imposed by quasisupermodularity and single crossing properties is particularly severe, in the sense that the set of two stage, 2 × 2 games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has measure zero. We also explore the more general question of when such games exhibit strategic complements (in the sense of increasing best responses) and find that the set of such games has infinite measure.
1
Our results are based on a detailed study of the notion of strategic complements in 1 Such a distinction does not hold for normal form games in general, as can be shown readily for the case of 2 × 2 games, where the set of games in which payoffs satisfy quasisupermodularity and single crossing properties has infinite measure. two stage, 2 × 2 games, and a characterization of when a player exhibits strategic complements in such games. This yields conditions on payoff functions that allow us to write (uncountably) many such extensive form games with strategic complements. Moreover, as steps in the development of the main results, we show that strategic complements implies a particular structure for best choices in the first and second stage games. This is important to characterize strategic complements.
The notion of subgame strategic complements used here is consistent with the notion of increasing extended best responses in Echenique (2004) , and therefore, his result that the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice continues to hold in the class of games considered here.
As is well-known, the problem of characterizing strategic complements in general extensive form games remains intractable.
2 As two stage, 2 × 2 games are a basic building block for multi-stage games and infinitely repeated games, our results may help other researchers to explore more general cases. In particular, our results show the need to go beyond a direct adaptation of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property as used in Echenique (2004) . In this regard, the lemmas below shed useful light on the structure of best responses that are consistent with strategic complements.
In order to present ideas more concretely, we consider an explicit example in the next section. The section after that defines the general framework and presents the main result characterizing strategic complements. The section after that formalizes the connection to 2 The reader may get a flavor of additional complexities related to Markov strategies and transition probabilities in infinite horizon models, as discussed in Amir (1996) , Curtat (1996) , and Balbus, Reffett, and Woźny (2014) .
Example
Consider the following two stage, 2 × 2 game. In the first stage, a 2 × 2 game (denoted game 0) is played in which player 1 can take actions in {A is played. In each game n = 1, 2, 3, 4, suppose action 1 is lower than action 2, that is,
The extensive form of the overall two stage game is depicted in figure 3 (assuming a discount factor of δ = 0.8).
In this two stage game, a strategy for player 1 is a 5-tuple s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ), where all strategies, denoted S, and is endowed with the product order. It is a (complete) lattice in the product order.
3 Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a 5-tuple t = (t
where for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, t n ∈ {B n 1 , B n 2 }. The strategy space for player 1 is the collection of all strategies, denoted T , and is endowed with the product order. It is also a (complete) lattice in the product order. We denote payoffs from a strategy profile (s, t)
by u 1 (s, t) for player 1 and u 2 (s, t) for player 2, as usual.
This makes the game into a lattice game (each player's strategy space is a lattice), and we can inquire if this game exhibits strategic complements. In other words, is the best response of one player increasing (in the lattice set order) 4 in the strategy of the other player?
Notice that the component games are very well behaved in terms of monotone com-3 We use standard lattice theoretic concepts. Useful references are Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Topkis (1998) . 4 See next section for the (standard) definition. Therefore, it is natural to expect that there are strategic complements in the two stage game.
Indeed, as shown below in more generality, this game does exhibit strategic complements. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that this game has two subgame perfect Nash equilibria, one given byŝ * = (A s,t) = 8 = u 1 (s,t), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies 13 = u 1 (ŝ,t) ≤ u 1 (ŝ ∧ s,t) = 5, a contradiction.
As shown below in theorems 1 and 2, this example is one of a large class of two stage, 2 × 2 games that exhibit strategic complements but do not satisfy Echenique's definition. Indeed, we show that the set of such games that satisfy Echenique's definition has measure zero, whereas the set of such games that exhibit strategic complements has infinite measure.
General Framework
Consider a general two stage, 2 × 2 game (denoted Γ). In the first stage, a 2 × 2 game (denoted game 0) is played in which player 1 can take actions in {A space for player 1 is the collection of all strategies, denoted S, and is endowed with the product order. Notice that S is a complete lattice in the product order. Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a 5-tuple t = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ), where for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
The strategy space for player 2 is the collection of all strategies, denoted T , and is endowed with the product order. The strategy space T is a complete lattice in the product order. This makes Γ into a lattice game (each player's strategy space is a lattice). We denote payoffs from a strategy profile (s, t) as u 1 (s, t) for player 1 and u 2 (s, t)
for player 2, as usual.
We shall formulate conditions under which such games exhibit strategic complements, defined in terms of increasing best responses, as usual. Player 1 exhibits strategic complements, if best response of player 1, denoted BR
Similarly, we may define when player 2 exhibits strategic complements. The game Γ is a game with strategic complements, if both players exhibit strategic complements.
Notice that strategic complements is defined for best response sets in the overall game.
As shown by a closer analysis of examples in Echenique (2004) and in more detail here, this is the hard case. When we want to include strategic complements in subgames, we shall assume that second-stage subgames exhibit strategic complements. As those are standard 2 × 2 games, conditions under which they exhibit strategic complements are well known.
In the remainder of this section, we make the assumption that payoffs to different final outcomes are different. Such a two stage, 2 × 2 game is termed a game with differential payoffs to outcomes. This assumption is sufficient to prove the results in this paper.
Theoretically, the set of two stage, 2 × 2 games with differential payoffs to outcomes is open, dense, and has full (Lebesgue) measure in R 16 × R 16 (the set of all such games).
The next three lemmas are important because they show implications of strategic complements in the class of games studied here. In addition to their contribution to prove theorem 1, these lemmas may help researchers to explore more general cases.
Lemma 1. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
For everyt,t ∈ T , for everyŝ ∈ BR 1 (t), and for everys ∈ BR 1 (t), ift 0 =t 0 , then 6 The lattice set order is the standard set order on lattices: A ⊑ B means that ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, a ∧ b ∈ A and a ∨ b ∈ B. It is sometimes termed the Veinott set order, or the strong set order.
Proof. Notice first that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes has the following implications for the structure of best responses. For every t ∈ T , and for everŷ s,s ∈ BR 1 (t), the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (ŝ, t) is the same as the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (s, t). Moreover, the actions played by each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (ŝ, t) are the same as the actions played by each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (s, t). Furthermore, every s ∈ S that has the same actions asŝ on the path of play for profile (ŝ, t) is also a member of BR 1 (t).
To prove the lemma, fixt,t ∈ T ,ŝ ∈ BR 1 (t), ands ∈ BR 1 (t). 2 ) ∈ BR 1 (t). Form t = (B 0 2 ,t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 ) and consider s ∈ BR 1 (t). Thent t, and using strategic complements for player 1, it follows thats ′ ∨ s ∈ BR 1 (t). In particular, subgame 4 is reached with profile (s ′ ∨ s, t), and therefore,
Suppose first thatt
Notice that on path of play for profile (s ′ ,t), subgame 3 is reached and the action played by player 1 in subgame 3 is A 3 1 .
Considerŝ ∈ BR 1 (t) and notice that the structure of best response of player 1 implies
Let t =t ∧t and consider s ∈ BR 1 (t). As t t , strategic complements for player 1 implies that s ∧ŝ ′ ∈ BR 1 (t). Notice that on path of play for profile (s ∧ŝ ′ , t), subgame 1 is reached, and therefore, the structure of best response for player 1 implies that s ′ = (A Lemma 1 shows that in the class of games considered here, strategic complements for player 1 implies that if a fixed first stage action is part of player 1's best response tot, then for every player 2 strategyt that has the same first stage action ast, every best response of player 1 must play the same fixed first stage action, and therefore, lead to the same subgame in stage two.
Lemma 2. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there existst ∈ T andŝ ∈ BR 1 (t) such thatt 0 = B Proof. Notice that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes implies the following about the structure of best responses: For every t ∈ T , and for everyŝ,s ∈ BR 1 (t), 1 ) ∈ T and let s ∈ BR 1 (t). Then by the previous lemma,
. Now fix arbitrarily t ∈ T and s ∈ BR 1 (t). As t t, strategic complements implies that s ∨ s ∈ BR 1 (t). As s 0 = A Part (1) of this lemma shows that if playing the higher action in the first stage is ever a best response of player 1 to player 2 playing the lower action in the first stage, then for every player 2 strategy t, playing the higher action must be a best response of player 1.
Similarly, part (2) of this lemma shows that if playing the lower action in the first stage is ever a best response of player 1 to player 2 playing the higher action in the first stage, then for every player 2 strategy t, playing the lower action must be a best response of player 1.
Lemma 3. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there existst ∈ T andŝ ∈ BR 1 (t) such thatt 0 = B 
Moreover, t t and strategic complements implies that s ′ ∧s ′ ∈ BR 1 (t) and consequently, structure of best responses implies that
To prove statement (2), fixt ∈ T andŝ ∈ BR 1 (t) such thatt 
and consequently, structure of best responses implies that
Statements (3) and (4) are proved similarly.
Lemma 3 presents a very useful characteristic of strategic complements in this setting.
Whenever a particular subgame is reached on the best response path, lemma 3 locates the unique action that must be chosen in that subgame to be consistent with strategic complements. For example, statement (1) says that if subgame 1 is ever on the best response path, then whenever there is a chance to reach subgame 1 (that is, t 0 = B In order to make theorem 1 more accessible, it is useful to define when an action dominates another action, not just in a given subgame, but across subgames as well. For m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and for k, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, action A Proof. For this proof, let T = {t ∈ T :
For sufficiency, suppose player 1 has strategic complements.
As case 1, suppose there existst ∈ T , there existsŝ ∈ BR 1 (t) such thatŝ 0 = A Now consider arbitraryt,t ∈ T such thatt
and therefore, BR 1 (t) ⊑ BR 1 (t). And ift
2 , then it is easy to check that BR 1 (t) ⊑ BR 1 (t). Thus, player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
The cases where statement 2(b) or 2(c) holds are proved similarly.
Notice that a similar characterization holds for player 2 has strategic complements.
As shown above, it is easy to write the conditions in statements 2(a), (b), and (c) in terms of the corresponding payoffs, and these conditions are easy to satisfy (see proof of theorem 2 below). Therefore, this characterization yields uncountably many examples of two stage, 2 × 2 games with strategic complements. 7 For reference, the example above satisfies statement 2(a) of the theorem.
Comparison to Echenique (2004)
Echenique ( Player 1 payoff function u 1 : S × T → R is quasisupermodular (in s), if for every t ∈ T and for every s, s
Player 1 payoff function u 1 : S × T → R satisfies single crossing property in (s; t), if for all t, t ′ ∈ T such that t ≺ t ′ and for all s, s
. These are defined similarly for player 2 payoff function u 2 . A two stage, 2 × 2 game satisfies Echenique complementarity , if the payoff function of each player is quasisupermodular in own strategy and satisfies single crossing property in (own strategy; other player strategy).
In order to state the following lemma, it is useful to recall when an action weakly dominates another action in a given subgame. For n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for k, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, Lemma 4. Consider a two stage, 2 × 2 game that satisfies Echenique complementarity.
For player 1, Theorem 2.
(1) In the set of two stage, 2×2 games with differential payoffs to outcomes, the set of games that satisfy Echenique complementarity is empty.
(2) In the set of all two stage, 2 × 2 games, the set of games that satisfy Echenique complementarity has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
(3) In the set of all two stage, 2 × 2 games, the set of games that satisfy strategic complements has infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
Proof. For the first statement, if a game satisfies Echenique complementarity, then lemma 4(1) shows that a The second statement follows, because the set of games with differential payoffs to outcomes has full (Lebesgue) measure and the first statement here shows that the set of games satisfying Echenique complementarity lies in the complement of this set.
Corollary 1.
(1) In the set of two stage, 2×2 games with differential payoffs to outcomes, the set of games that satisfy subgame Echenique complementarity is empty.
(2) In the set of all two stage, 2×2 games, the set of games that satisfy subgame Echenique complementarity has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
(3) In the set of all two stage, 2 × 2 games, the set of games that satisfy subgame strategic complements has infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
Proof. The first two statements follow immediately from the corresponding statements in theorem 2. For the third statement, notice that the infinite measure set listed in the proof of theorem 2 is constructed to also satisfy subgame strategic complements. In particular, games with payoffs in that set have the property that for player 1, action A Finally, the next theorem follows immediately by noting that subgame strategic complements implies increasing extended best response correspondences, as used in Echenique (2004) , and to apply his corresponding result.
Theorem 3. In every two stage, 2 × 2 game with subgame strategic complements, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice.
Proof. Apply theorem 9 in Echenique (2004) by noting that its proof only requires nonempty, increasing best responses in every subgame, which is satisfied here.
